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''The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique'' is a 1984 book by Adolf Grünbaum, who provides a critique of Sigmund Freud and the scientific credentials of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Grünbaum argues that there are methodological and epistemological reasons to conclude that some central Freudian theories are not well supported by empirical evidence.〔Quinn 2005. p. 355.〕 ==Summary== Grünbaum offers a critique of the scientific credentials of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, arguing that there are methodological and epistemological reasons to think that some central Freudian doctrines are not well supported by empirical evidence.〔 (For example, Grünbaum is critical of Freud's theory of dreams,〔Hopkins 1991. p. 122.〕 which he considers the cornerstone of psychoanalysis).〔Hobson 1993. p. 489.〕 Despite taking this position, Grünbaum approves of Freud's interpretation of religion〔Kovel 1991. p. 250.〕 and argues against the idea that psychoanalysis is a pseudo-science. He criticizes Sir Karl Popper's view that psychoanalytic propositions cannot be disconfirmed and that psychoanalysis is therefore pseudo-scientific.〔Gay 1995. p. 745.〕〔Ruse 1988. pp. 31, 280.〕〔Webster 2005. p. 24.〕 Grünbaum considers Popper, like many other philosophers who have written about Freud, to be both a very poor reader of Freud and a poor logician. Grünbaum observes, for example, that Freud's theory that paranoia results from repressed homosexuality invites the obviously falsifiable prediction that a decline in the repression of homosexuality should result in a corresponding of paranoia, thereby disproving Popper's claim that psychoanalytic propositions are unfalsifiable.〔Robinson 1993. pp. 182-183.〕 Grünbaum is also critical of the hermeneutic interpretation of psychoanalysis propounded by Jürgen Habermas in ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (1968). He argues that Habermas misunderstands psychoanalysis, falsely maintaining that it abandons the scientific norm in its aspirations. Grünbaum, drawing on his knowledge of modern physics, contends that Habermas is ignorant of science.〔Robinson 1993. pp. 188-189.〕 Paul Ricœur's hermeneutic interpretation of Freud in his ''Freud and Philosophy'' (1965) is similarly criticized by Grünbaum. Ricœur seeks to limit the proper subject of psychoanalysis to the verbal communications of the patient in analysis, something Grünbaum denounces as "ideological surgery" and "mutilation" of psychoanalysis. Grünbaum shows that Freud could not have accepted such a limited conception of the proper domain of psychoanalysis, since he often considered the nonverbal behavior of patients, speculated about the psychological meaning of artifacts such as statues and paintings, and most importantly believed that his discoveries held true for people who had never been analyzed and therefore never had to produce a narrative account of their symptoms.〔Robinson 1993. pp. 195-196, 198.〕 In Grünbaum's view, the causal claims of psychoanalysis must be assessed through methodological procedures deriving from the work of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill.〔Hopkins 1991. pp. 127-128.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「The Foundations of Psychoanalysis」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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